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To cite this version:
Francois Trousset, Pascal Poncelet, Florent Masseglia. SAX: A Privacy Preserving General Purpose Method applied to Detection of Intrusions. ACM First International Workshop on Privacy and Anonymity for Very Large Datasets, join with CIKM 09, Nov 2009, Hong Kong, China. pp.17-24. lirmm-00430646

HAL Id: lirmm-00430646
https://hal-lirmm.ccsd.cnrs.fr/lirmm-00430646
Submitted on 9 Nov 2009

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SAX: A Privacy Preserving General Purpose Method applied to Detection of Intrusions

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ABSTRACT
To overcome the problem of attacks on networks, new Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS) approaches have been proposed in recent years. They consist in identifying signatures of known attacks to compare them to each request and determine whether it is an attack or not. However, these methods are set to default when the attack is unknown. However, it is frequent that an attack has already been detected by another organization and it would be useful to be able to benefit from this knowledge to enrich the database of signatures. Unfortunately this information is not so easy to obtain. In fact organizations do not necessarily want to spread the information that they have already faced this type of attack. In this paper we propose a new approach to intrusion detection in a collaborative environment but by preserving the privacy of the collaborative organizations. Our approach works for any signature even if it needs a complex program to be detected and ensure that no information is disclosed on the content of any of the sites. For this propose, we have developed a general method (SAX) that allows to compute any algorithm while preserving privacy of data and also of the program code which is computed.

Categories and Subject Descriptors
D.4.6 [Security and Protection]: Algorithms, Privacy

General Terms
Algorithms, Security

Keywords
Intrusion Detection, Attacks, Collaborative Organizations, Privacy

1. INTRODUCTION
The fast growing computational Grid environments has increased risk of attack and intrusion. Thus misuse detection has become a real concern for companies and organizations. Whereas earlier attacks focused on Web servers (often misconfigured or poorly maintained), the most recent ones take advantage of Security service and Web application weaknesses which become more vulnerable \([4, 2]\). To overcome this problem, new approaches called Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS) have been developed. Installed on networks, they aim to analyze traffic requests and detect malicious behavior (e.g. Prelude-IDS, Snort). They can be classified into two broad categories (e.g. \([8, 9]\)):\ the Anomaly Detection Systems which attempt to detect attacks and the Abuse Detection Systems which detects unknown comportment so called abuse from a specification of allowed ones.

Recently approaches called Collaborative Intrusion Detection Systems (CIDS) (e.g. \([1, 12, 5, 7, 11]\)) have been proposed. In comparison with isolated IDS, CIDS significantly improve time and efficiency of misuse detections by sharing information on attacks between distributed IDS from one or more organizations. The main principle of these approaches is to exchange information using peer to peer links. However the exchanged information are mostly limited to IP addresses of requests (e.g. \([1, 5, 7]\)) and consider that data can be freely exchanged among the peers. The last constraint is very strong: companies, for reasons of confidentiality, do not want to spread out that they were attacked and therefore are unwilling to give any information on it.

In this article we propose a secure collaborative detection approach, called SAX (Secure Algorithm Execution), which ensures that private data and programs will not be disclosed. Via our approach, any program from the various collaborative sites can be executed without disclosing any information from the local IDS to the outside. Collaborative Sites are free to work with signatures of attacks or non-attacks and may give information on the type of intrusion detected. Thus, when new request is checked, the response will be one of: it is an attack (with its type if available), it is a non-attack, or unknown (if none of the IDS data leads to a positive or negative conclusion). To our knowledge, very little studies are concerned with this topic of security in such collaborative environment. The only works \([10, 7]\) consider both collaborative and security aspects. In its context, security mainly concerns information on IP addresses and ports. It uses Bloom’s filters to manage data exchanges. Our problem is different in that, we want to exchange data, i.e. more complex than IP addresses and ports. In fact we wants to be able to exchange and execute any algorithm of anomaly detection on the full request.

In previous studies, we focused on those anomalies whose permission to make digital or hard copies of all or part of this work for personal or classroom use is granted without fee provided that copies are not made or distributed for profit or commercial advantage and that copies bear this notice and the full citation on the first page. To copy otherwise, to republish, to post on servers or to redistribute to lists, requires prior specific permission and/or a fee.

\textit{CIKM’09, November 2–6, 2009, Hong Kong, China.}  
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signature detection may be expressed as a regular expres-
sions. But there is still a lot of cases that cannot be ex-
pressed like that and which need specific programs to be
detected. Instead of handling them one by one, we de-
cided to study a general purpose method able to execute any pro-
gram while preserving privacy of data and also of the pro-
gram code (once it has been translated into the adequate
formalism). This method is described in this article.

The article is organized as follows. In section 2, we present
the problem. An overview of our approach is given in sec-
ction 3 and 4. The various algorithms are described in section
5. Finally section 6 concludes and presents various perspec-
tives.

2. PROBLEM STATEMENT

DB is a database such as $DB = DB_1 \cup DB_2 \ldots \cup DB_D$.
Each database $DB_i$ is equivalent to a tuple $< id, S_{Alg} >$
where $id$ is the identifier of the database and $S_{Alg}$ is a set of
anomaly detection programs expressed as a finite state au-
tomaton and initial program data. The details are described
in section 3. The other part of input data of the program
is the request string $R$ owned by the client site $S$. Each
program will provide two kinds of value: a three states flag
(True/False/Unknown) specifying whether the request is
an attack or not or has not been identified at all and an in-
teger (the type of the attack) when the request is effectively
identified as an attack (True state).

Definition 1. Given a database $DB = DB_1 \cup DB_2 \ldots \cup DB_D$ and a request string $R$, the secure approach in such a
collaborative environment consists in finding a program $Alg$
from $DB$ such that execution of $Alg$ upon $R$ gives a False or
True result (identify an attack or a non-attack) while ensur-
ing that the client site does not provide the request string
$R$ to anyone and that none of the databases $DB_i$ provided
any information from its content to anyone (programs and
data).

3. THE SAX APPROACH

This section will provide an overview of the secure archi-
tecture SAX (Secure Algorithm eXecution). It is designed
to answer the problem of privacy preserving in a collabora-
tive environment. Inspired by the work of [6], this archi-
tecture offers the advantage of achieving the various operations
while ensuring that neither party may have access to private
data contained in the initial databases. In addition to the
client site which is responsible to provide the request to
be tested, the architecture requires four non-collaborative
and semi honest sites [3]: they follow the protocol correctly,
but are free to use the information they have collected dur-
ing the execution of the protocol. These independent sites
collect, store and evaluate information in a secure way. The
different functions provided by these sites are:

- The Control Site CTRL: CTRL is used to rule the
  various operations needed to execute the program To
do this, it interacts with the two non colluding sites
  $NC_1$ and $NC_2$.

- Non Colluding Sites $NC_1$ and $NC_2$: These two
  symmetric sites collects garbled data from all databases
  as well as the garbled request to be tested from $S$.

Under the control of CTRL and by interaction with
$PS$, they perform several secure operations in order to
insure that none of them will be able to infer any of
the intermediate results or the final result which is
returned to site $S$.

- The Processing Site $PS$: This site is used both by
  $NC_1$ and $NC_2$ to process, in a secure way, the various
  needed operations. Like $NC_1$ and $NC_2$, $PS$ also can-
  not deduce any pertinent value of intermediate or final
  result from the data it processes.

Remark: The data kept by $NC_1$ ($\hat{\rho}$) and $NC_2$ ($\overline{\rho}$)
are random data such that $\hat{\rho} \oplus \overline{\rho} = V$ where $V$ is the real
value. But as $NC_1$ and $NC_2$ are non-colluding, the value of
$V$ will never be known by any of the sites. (Details will be
explained in the following sections).

3.1 Encoding of the program

To perform a secure computation of client site $S$ data by
a program coming from an external site $DB_i$ (which may be
anonymized), we consider the program as a deterministic
automaton $< State, Trans, Init, Final >$ where $State$ is the
set of states of the automaton, $Init$ is the initial state, $Final$
is the set of final states and $Trans$ is the set of transitions.
Each transition is a quadruplet $(S_{initial}, Action, S_{final0},$
$S_{final1})$ meaning that if the automaton is in state $S_{initial}$
and that $Action$ is performed and returns a boolean value
then the automaton’s current state changes to $S_{final0}$ if the
boolean value is false or to $S_{final1}$ if it is true. The
automaton starts with state $Init$ and ends when reaching
any of the final states from $Final$.

Remark: To ensure that computation is secure, none of
the performed action shall return any data to the site $DB_i$
which gave the program to be computed. This means that
only the client site $S$ gets results.

This encoding implies that all of the states (but final ones)
are connected to two other states in the graph of the automa-
ton (in fact $S_{final0}$ and $S_{final1}$). These links are designated by
$\oplus$ leading to $S_{final0}$ and $\ominus$ leading to $S_{final1}$.

Each action is in fact a list of 3-uplets $(OpNum, Aff1, Aff2)$
where $OpNum$ is the number of the operation to be
processed, and $Aff1$ and $Aff2$ are two random sequences of
bits of of same length. Each 3-uplet of the list performs
the same action by using different operators which will be
effectively executed by $NC_1$ and $NC_2$. There is a list to
avoid $NC_1$ and $NC_2$ from deducing any link between the
value of $OpNum$ and a “corresponding state” in $CTRL$.

The automaton is managed by $CTRL$ while $NC_1$, $NC_2$
maintain the memory and performs the operations on the
values through $PS$. If $CTRL$ maintains the list of opera-
tion numbers to be performed for each node, the protocol
to be performed when executing this operation is aimed by
$NC_1$ and $NC_2$ and data used as input and output of this
operation will only be kept (garbled) in $NC_1$ and $NC_2$. Thus
$CTRL$ will know nothing about the real operation that is
performed and no more on the values used and produced by
the operation. $NC_1$ and $NC_2$ also owns a list of $Registers$
which contains address in the memory. The register will be
used to perform indirect and based memory access. Instead
of the data kept in their memory which are garbled, the real
values of registers are known by both $NC_1$ and $NC_2$. 

Remark: The data kept by $NC_1$ ($\hat{\rho}$) and $NC_2$ ($\overline{\rho}$)
are random data such that $\hat{\rho} \oplus \overline{\rho} = V$ where $V$ is the real
value. But as $NC_1$ and $NC_2$ are non-colluding, the value of
$V$ will never be known by any of the sites. (Details will be
explained in the following sections).
After Performing the Action associated to a state, CTRL receives two bits (one from NC1 and one from NC2). If these two bits are identical then CTRL follows the link ⊕ otherwise it follows the link ⊖.

For each operation OpNum of CTRL, NC1 and NC2 have a corresponding 5-uplet (Protos, NCA, Arg1, Arg2, Res, Incr) where Protos is a list of binary operations (p elements), NCA is a random number (1+m+n+p+q bits), Arg1 is the list of values from the memory that may potentially be used as first argument of operation (n elements), Arg2 is similar to Arg1 but for the second argument (m elements), Res is the list of potential storages for the result in the memory (q elements), and Incr is the list (r elements) of couples (Register, IncrVal) giving increments to perform on registers at the end of the operation. In fact the Arg1, Arg2 and Res are couples (Position, Length) where Length is the number of bits of the value and Position is either a position in the memory or a register number Reg and an Offset to perform indirect or based memory addressing.

Remark: there is several ways to implement an action that does only register increments, but it also exists a non operation prototype named NOPS designed for this purpose.

Remark: Aff1, Aff2 are such that Aff = Aff1 ⊕ Aff2 ⊕ NCA ⊕ NCA where NCA is the part of NCA owned by NC1 and NCA is the part owned by NC2. Aff is a list of boolean flags (true/false) that are used to specify which affection shall be effectively done (see section 3.3). We will use the notations \( \tilde{A}_{ff} = Aff1 ⊕ NCA \) owned by NC1 and \( \tilde{A}_{ff} = Aff2 ⊕ NCA \) owned by NC2.

In fact Aff1 = \( \tilde{A}_{ff} ⊕ RND_1 \), Aff2 = \( \tilde{A}_{ff} ⊕ RND_2 \), NCA = RND3 ⊕ RND4 is owned by NC1 and NCA = RND2 ⊕ RND3 is owned by NC2 where RND1, RND2 and RND3 are generated by DB, and Aff = \( \tilde{A}_{ff} ⊕ \tilde{A}_{ff} \).

3.2 Initialization of the processus and global processing

The exchange of data between the different sites is done by using the secure method SEND5 \( \tilde{V} \odot \tilde{V} \) which sends the vector of bits \( V = \tilde{V} ⊕ \tilde{V} \) to NC1 and NC2. It is defined in order to send \( \tilde{V} \) to NC1 and \( \tilde{V} \) to NC2 (or vice versa). A random vector \( R \) is used to garble transmitted data such that \( \tilde{V} = R \) and \( \tilde{V} = V ⊕ R \) or vice versa. This method is used in particular to send the data from the databases DB and to send the request from site S. Thus, the process described in figure 1 starts in the following way:

* First, the site S sends its request to NC1 and NC2 using the SENDS method (See arrow number 1 in figure 1).
* More precisely, the request \( R \) is taken in its boolean form: a vector of bits.
* A random vector of bits \( A_R \) is then generated with the same size as the request \( R \) to compute the new vector \( Z_R = A_R ⊕ R \). \( Z_R \) is sent to NC1 and \( A_R \) to NC2 (or vice versa).
* Each database \( DB_i \) sends the transition matrix of its automaton to CTRL (See arrows number 2) The size of the needed memory, the number of needed address registers and their initial value are naturally sent to NC1 and NC2 as their real values are known by both sites. The initial value of the memory is sent to NC1 and NC2 by using SENDS. \( DB_i \) also sends the list of actions to be performed (5-uplets) to NC1 and NC2.

From this point, the computation of the request is done under the control of CTRL. It will ask NC1 and NC2 execute action (See arrow number 3).

* The action is effectively performed securely by NC1 and NC2 through PS (See arrow number 4 and 5).
* The result of the action is a boolean divided in two parts, one is owned by NC1 and the other by NC2 such that none are able to infer its real value. Both parts are then securely returned to CTRL (see arrows 5 and 6).
* While NC1 and NC2 are updating the value of the different registers as need led by the action, CTRL compares the two values he received and updates the current state of the automate in consequence.
* The process is repeated under control of CTRL unless the automaton moves into a final state.
* When entering a Final state, the result value previously stored by the program by executing the secure action AFFECT5 is aggregated or sent to the client site S by NC1 and NC2 (See arrow number 7) under the control of CTRL.

Figure 1: General Architecture of SAX
This choice depends of the configuration of the anonymity behaviour (See section 4).

3.3 Execution of action

When CTRL enter a non final state, he starts by randomly selecting one of the 3-uplets (OpNum, Aff1, Aff2) from the list associated to this state. It then generates a random number ROP of same length than Aff1 and Aff2. Then CTRL sends \( \tilde{a}n = Aff1 \oplus ROP \) to NC1 and \( \tilde{a}n = Aff2 \oplus ROP \) to NC2.

NC1 (respectively NC2) computes the vectors of bits \( \tilde{\lambda} = \tilde{\lambda}R \oplus \tilde{\lambda}C \) (respectively \( \tilde{\lambda} = \tilde{\lambda}R \oplus \tilde{\lambda}C \)) and extract \( \tilde{\lambda} = \tilde{\lambda}[0] \), \( \tilde{\lambda}^i = \tilde{\lambda}[1..n] \), \( \tilde{\lambda} = \tilde{\lambda}[n + 1..n + m] \), \( \tilde{\lambda}^i = \tilde{\lambda}[n + m + 1..n + m + p] \) and \( \tilde{\lambda}^i = \tilde{\lambda}[n + m + p + 1..n + m + p + q] \) (and respectively NC2 extract then \( \tilde{\lambda} \) parts from \( \tilde{\lambda} \)). We will use the notation \( \tilde{\lambda}_i \) for \( \tilde{\lambda}[j] \) which is the \( j \)th bit of the vector of bits \( \tilde{\lambda}^i \) and similarly for the \( \tilde{\lambda} \) form.

Now let \( \tilde{\lambda}^2 \) and \( \tilde{\lambda}^3 \) (respectively \( \tilde{\lambda}^1 \) and \( \tilde{\lambda}^2 \)) be two distinct vectors of bits of length greater or equal to the lengths on any of the values in \( \tilde{\lambda}^2 \). If \( \tilde{\lambda}^2 \) and \( \tilde{\lambda}^3 \) used to store the actual arguments of operations. We shall also use \( \tilde{\lambda} \) and \( \tilde{\lambda} \) (respectively \( \tilde{\lambda} \) and \( \tilde{\lambda} \)) to store the computed results of the operation.

Now NC1 (respectively NC2) computes the following secure instructions (See notations in section 5):

```
foreach i \in [1..n] do AFFECT\( i, \tilde{\lambda}_i, d_{\tilde{\lambda}_i, \tilde{\lambda}_i}; \)
foreach i \in [1..m] do AFFECT\( i, \tilde{\lambda}_i, s_{\tilde{\lambda}_i}; \)
(\( \tilde{\lambda} \)) = (\( \tilde{\lambda}_1, \tilde{\lambda}_2, \ldots, \tilde{\lambda}_n \));
(\( \tilde{\lambda} \)) = (\( \tilde{\lambda}_1, \tilde{\lambda}_2, \ldots, \tilde{\lambda}_m \));
```

Remark: There exists more complex operators on indexes but incrementation is sufficient for our purpose as we shall care that operations on indexes are not private: NC1 and NC2 knows their real value. We shall notice that operation on indexes shall never combine data stored in the memory otherwise NC1 and NC2 will gain access to the real values stored in their memory.

3.4 Proof of privacy

Property 1. This implementation allows to compute securely any program while encoded in the correct form.

Proof: The secure operations computed may be any boolean operation. We have encoded the operation and \( (\land \overline{S}) \) and not \( (\overline{S}) \) that form a generator system of the booleans. That means that any other boolean operation may be encoded securely. If in theory, we consider the memory maintained by NC1 and NC2 to be infinite it is easy to encode any Turing Machine using CTRL, NC1, NC2 and PS. To do that we only need one Register, and to decompose each transaction of the Turing Machine in three single transactions of our automaton, the first consists in testing the value at the current (Register) position by using COMPARE\( S \), the second stores new data at the current position using AFFECT\( S \) and the third increments the Register with value 1 or -1 using operator NOP\( S \).

Property 2. This secure execution of a program prohibits DB to know any of the client’s data.

Proof: The proof is evident as no data is returned to DB. On the client side, it may not be true but it depends on the program which is computed by the system which is of the responsibility of DB. Thus if the program deliver data comming from DB to the client, that means that DB (who writes the program) has decided that it shall be so and thus it is a normal result approved by DB.

Property 3. CTRL does not know any of the incoming and outgoing data and does not even know what processing has been performed on the data.

Proof: CTRL does not have access to any of the data managed by NC1 and NC2. It also has only access to operation numbers and does not know to which protocols it corresponds. Further more the values of Aff1 and Aff2 are pure random values from which it cannot infer anything, even the length of those may be greater that the one really needed by NC1 or NC2. The only thing that CTRL may infer is the sequence of states encoutered during a run.

Property 4. None of NC1, NC2 or PS can infer what processing has been performed.

Proof: At each step, when executing an action, NC1 and NC2 perform several operation using various values from the memory and it does not know which of the values will be used as inputs of the operator, nor which result is stored in the memory no more than where it is effectively stored. This is due to the usage of the secure conditional assignment operator AFFECT\( S \).

Secondly when NC1 is performing any boolean operation it does not know if NC2 negates or not any of the value or the result (because to implement the negation, only one from NC1 and NC2 has to negate the value which is a property of \( \cdot \oplus \cdot \) : if \( A = X \oplus Y \) then \( \overline{A} = \overline{X} \oplus \overline{Y} = X \oplus Y \).

Property 5. None of NC1, NC2 or PS can deduce any real value of the incoming or produced data.

Proof: NC1 and NC2 own only garbled data at the beginning of the process. During the processing the usage of secure operators insure that they get only garbled data from witch they cannot infer any information on the real values. In the case of PS it does not owns any data and gets pure random data from NC1 and NC2 and returns random values. (See proof of operators for more details).

Remark: The values of \( m, n, p, q \) and \( r \) are chosen by DB, when producing the automata. The cost in time is linearly increasing with the value of \( m + n + p + q + r \). At the same time, the “randomness” of the resulting program increases by \( m \cdot n \cdot p \cdot q \cdot r \). When encoding program DB must choose values such that time cost is bearable and garbling of the algorithm is the highest one.

4. ANONYMISATION

There is two main ways to do anonymization: in buffering inputs programs issued by databases DB, and execute them randomly or in buffering results before sending them.
randomly to the client. The first one essentially introduce costs in term of space (we need to store the automata in CTRL and associated data in NC1 and NC2). The second one essentially introduce time costs (we may process other DBs’s programs while the desired result has already been obtained. And we will do that until the client gets this result). A third way is to mix the two approaches and adapt parameters (size of both buffers) to adjust anonymization process according to the needs and bearable costs.

As we are dealing with anomaly detection, the result is not so complex: an algorithm may detect an attack and then give the type of the detected attack, or identify a non attack request or may not be able to identify the request. In fact only the first positive or negative result has to be kept.

The secure implementation of this operation (which is shown in algorithm 1 ensure that no one can infer whether the affection has effectively been done or not. That means that no one can predict the value stored in Var unless it already know the value of Cond (but NC1 and NC2 only knows random values).

The secure operator AFFECTS shall be used in the following way:

\[ \text{AFFECT}^s(\text{Var}, \text{Cond}, \text{Var}'; \text{Var}, \text{Cond}, \text{Var}) \]

where 's' are owned by NC1 and 's' are owned by NC2.

The implementation of AFFECTS require the secure operators \[ V^S(\vec{x}, \vec{y}, \vec{z}) \rightarrow (\vec{v}|v) \] and \[ \land^S(\vec{x}, \vec{y}, \vec{z}) \rightarrow (\vec{v}|v) \] which implements respectively a secure computation of bitwise operators OR and AND on vectors of bits of same length (S1 and S2) and returns the sequence V. At the end of the process of AFFECTS, the new value computed will be stored in the original variables V_ar for NC1 and V_ar for NC2.

Algorithm 1: Algorithm AFFECTS

**Data:** Var = V_ar ⊕ V_ar of length n is the value of the variable.

// Value = V_ar + V_ar is the value to be conditionally affected (of length n).

// Cond = Cond ⊕ Cond is the 1 bit condition true if the affection shall be done and false otherwise.

1. ∀ k ∈ 1.., NC1, NC2 and PS compute \[ (\vec{w}_k|\vec{w}_k) = \land^S(\bigvee^S(\text{Cond}, \text{Var}w_k|\text{Cond}, \text{Var}w_k); \bigvee^S(\neg\text{Cond}, \text{Var}w_k) \]

2. NC1 and NC2 respectively computes \[ V_{ar} = \vec{w} \] and \[ V_{ar}' = \vec{w}' \]

**Property 6.** AFFECTS prohibits NC1 and NC2 to access the value stored in the variable Var. They even do not know if the value stored in Var has changed or not.

**Proof:** All the values stored in NC1 and NC2 are randomized. This count also for V_ar, Cond and Value. That means that none knows the real value stored in Var and Value. To know whether Value is affected to Var or not they shall know the real value of Cond but as it is also randomized they cannot infer whether the value of Var has been changed or not. In any case, the new value of V_ar and V_ar' are new random values whatever the affection has been effective or not.

**Complexity:** The methods \[ \bigvee^S \] and \[ \bigwedge^S \] are used 2n and n times respectively on one bit. By reusing the complexity of operators \[ \bigvee^S \] and \[ \bigwedge^S \] (see section 5.2), NC1 and NC2 therefore perform 34n aleatory bits, send 12n bits and receive 10n bits (including parameters). PS performs 12n binary operations, generates 3n + 1 aleatory bits, receives 12n bits (6n from NC1 and NC2 each) and sends 6n bits (3n to NC1 and NC2 each). Obviously this has to be compared with the length of inputs (n bits).
Algorithm 2: The Algorithm $\wedge^S$

Data: $(\hat{x}, \hat{y}|\hat{x}, \hat{y})$ vector of bit/s are such that $\hat{x}$ and $\hat{y}$ are in NC1, and $\hat{x}$ and $\hat{y}$ are in NC2

Result: $(A^R \oplus B^R)$ is such that

$$A^R \oplus B^R = (\hat{x} \oplus \hat{x}) \wedge (\hat{y} \oplus \hat{y})$$

1. NC1 and NC2 mutually generate and exchange four random vector of bit/s $R_A, R_A^\prime, R_B$ and $R_B^\prime$ such that:

$$\hat{x} = \hat{x} \oplus R_A, \hat{y} = \hat{y} \oplus R_A^\prime,$$

$$\hat{x}^\prime = \hat{x} \oplus R_B \text{ and } \hat{y}^\prime = \hat{y} \oplus R_B^\prime.$$  

2. NC1 sends $\hat{x}^\prime$ and $\hat{y}^\prime$ to PS.

3. NC2 sends $\hat{x}^\prime$ and $\hat{y}^\prime$ to PS.

4. PS computes $\hat{c} = \hat{x}^\prime \wedge \hat{y}^\prime$ and $\hat{t} = \hat{x}^\prime \wedge \hat{y}^\prime$ and generates a random vector of bit/s $R_{PS}$.

5. PS sends $A_{PS} = \hat{c} \oplus R_{PS}$ to NC1 and $B_{PS} = \hat{c} \oplus R_{PS}$ to NC2.

6. NC1 computes $A^R = A_{PS} \oplus ((\hat{x} \wedge R_B) \oplus (\hat{y} \wedge R_B))$ $\oplus (\hat{x} \wedge \hat{y}) \oplus (R_B \wedge R_A^\prime)$

7. NC2 computes $B^R = B_{PS} \oplus ((\hat{x} \wedge R_A^\prime) \oplus (\hat{y} \wedge R_A) \oplus (\hat{x} \wedge \hat{y}) \oplus (R_B \wedge R_A^\prime)$

5.2 The algorithms $\wedge^S$ and $\vee^S$

In this section, we define algorithms used to implement the secure operator $\wedge^S$ and $\vee^S$, the basic principle of these algorithms is to add uniform random noise to the data which could be deleted from the final result.

The $\wedge^S$ protocol begins with NC1 and NC2 who modify their data by doing XOR them with random values (see step 1 in algorithm ). NC1 and NC2 share these random values (also see step 1). Garbled data are then send to PS (step 2 and 3) which is now able to compute $\wedge$ in a secure way (step 4). In fact, PS gets only garbled inputs indistinguishable from random and unrelated to each others and thus calculates random values from its point of view.

To avoid NC1 and NC2 from inferring the final result, it does XOR with random noise to the values it calculates before sending them back to NC1 and NC2 (step 5). Now NC1 and NC2 may both obtain their part of the final result by removing the random noise they added on step 1 (see step 6 and 7). The final result is obtained by computing:

$$A^R \oplus B^R = A_{PS} \oplus (\hat{x} \wedge R_B) \oplus (\hat{y} \wedge R_B) \oplus (\hat{x} \wedge \hat{y}) \oplus (R_B \wedge R_A^\prime) \oplus B_{PS} \oplus (\hat{x} \wedge R_A^\prime) \oplus (\hat{y} \wedge R_A) \oplus (\hat{x} \wedge \hat{y}) \oplus (R_A \wedge R_B)$$

where:

$$A_{PS} \oplus B_{PS} = (\hat{x} \wedge R_B) \oplus (\hat{y} \wedge R_B) \oplus (\hat{x} \wedge R_A^\prime) \oplus (\hat{y} \wedge R_A^\prime) \oplus (\hat{x} \wedge \hat{y}) \oplus (R_A \wedge R_B) \oplus (R_B \wedge R_A^\prime) \oplus R_{PS} \oplus R_{PS}.$$

Using the property of the XOR operator: $R \oplus R = 0$, we get the desired result: $A^R \oplus B^R = \hat{x} \wedge \hat{y} \oplus \hat{x} \wedge \hat{y} \oplus \hat{x} \wedge \hat{y}$.

$\oplus \hat{x} \wedge \hat{y}$. Which is a re-written form of $(\hat{x} \oplus \hat{x}) \wedge (\hat{y} \oplus \hat{y})$. However, this operation is never performed by the non collaborative sites and the final result is kept shared between NC1 and NC2.

The $\vee^S$ protocol is identical to the $\wedge^S$ protocol except for the last two steps (steps 6 and 7) performed by NC1 and NC2. Thus we get the final result:

$$A^R \oplus B^R = \hat{x} \oplus \hat{y} \oplus (\hat{x} \wedge \hat{y}) \oplus (\hat{x} \wedge \hat{y}) \oplus (\hat{x} \wedge \hat{y}) \oplus (R_A \wedge R_B) \oplus (R_B \wedge R_A) \oplus (\hat{x} \wedge \hat{y}) \oplus (\hat{x} \wedge \hat{y}) \oplus (\hat{x} \wedge \hat{y}) \oplus (\hat{x} \wedge \hat{y}) \oplus (\hat{x} \wedge \hat{y})$$

This reduce to the desired result: $A^R \oplus B^R = \hat{x} \oplus \hat{y} \oplus (\hat{x} \wedge \hat{y}) \oplus (\hat{x} \wedge \hat{y}) \oplus (\hat{x} \wedge \hat{y}) \oplus (\hat{x} \wedge \hat{y}) \oplus (\hat{x} \wedge \hat{y})$ which is a re-written form of $(\hat{x} \oplus \hat{x}) \vee (\hat{y} \oplus \hat{y})$.

Algorithm 3: The algorithm $\vee^S$

Data: $(\hat{x}, \hat{y}|\hat{x}, \hat{y})$ vector of bit/s such that $\hat{x}$ et $\hat{y}$ belongs to NC1, $\hat{x}$ and $\hat{y}$ belongs to NC2.

Result: $(A^R \oplus B^R)$ is such that $A^R \oplus B^R = (\hat{x} \oplus \hat{x}) \vee (\hat{y} \oplus \hat{y})$.

1.5. These steps are same as initial 5 steps of $\wedge^S$ function.

6. NC1 computes $A^R = A_{PS} \oplus (\hat{x} \wedge R_B) \oplus (\hat{y} \wedge R_B)$ $\oplus (\hat{x} \wedge \hat{y}) \oplus (R_B \wedge R_A^\prime)$

7. NC2 computes $B^R = B_{PS} \oplus (\hat{x} \wedge R_A^\prime) \oplus (\hat{y} \wedge R_A) \oplus (\hat{x} \wedge \hat{y}) \oplus (R_A \wedge R_B)$

Property 7. $\wedge^S$ and $\vee^S$ forbid NC1 to gain any information of private data of NC2 (and vice versa). Moreover, the PS learns none of their private inputs.

Proof: From the protocol, $B_{PS}$ is the only value that NC2 can learn from the private data of NC1. Due to the noise, $R_{PS}$, added by PS, NC2 is still not able to deduce the values of $\hat{x}$ or $\hat{y}$. As the roles of NC1 and NC2 are interchangeable, the same argument holds for NC1, not able to learn the private inputs $\hat{x}$ or $\hat{y}$ of NC2. However, one key security aspect of not leaking any information to PS is achieved by randomizing the inputs before transmitting them to the Processing Site. Due to the randomization performed during the initial step, it just infers a stream of uniformly distributed values, and cannot distinguish between a genuine and a random value.

Complexity: Length of bit vector is 1: For the operator $\wedge^S$, NC1 and NC2 each performs 10 binary operations ($\oplus$ and $\wedge$). $\vee^S$ does two more $\oplus$ that means 12 binary operations. For both operators NC1 and NC2 generate 2 random bits, exchange 2 x 2 random bits and send 2 x 1 bits to PS. PS generates 1 random bit and performs 4 binary operation ($2 \oplus 2 \wedge$) and returns 2 bits to NC1 and NC2 each.
5.3 The Algorithm COMPARE$^S$

Algorithm 4: The Algorithm COMPARE$^S$

Data: Half part of V and W is owned by NC$^i_1$ and the other part is owned by NC$^i_2$

Result: $\langle \hat{a} | \hat{a}_i \rangle$ is such that $\forall i \hat{a}_i \oplus \hat{a} = 1$ if $V = W$ else 0

1. NC$^i_1$ computes $X \leftarrow \vec{v} \oplus \vec{w}$ where $X = (X_1, X_2, \ldots, X_l)$ and $l$ is the length of vector V and W.

2. NC$^i_2$ computes $Y \leftarrow \vec{v} \oplus \vec{w}$ where $Y = (Y_1, Y_2, \ldots, Y_l)$.

3. $\langle \vec{a}_1 | \vec{a}_2 \rangle \leftarrow OR^S(X_1, X_2, \ldots, X_l | Y_1, Y_2, \ldots, Y_l)$

4. There is two ways to gets the resul either NC$^i_1$, NC$^i_2$ perform $\langle \hat{a}_i | \hat{a}_i \rangle \leftarrow (\neg \vec{a}_i | \neg \vec{a}_i)$ or $\langle \hat{a}_i \hat{a}_i \rangle \leftarrow (\vec{a}_i | \vec{a}_i \neg)$.

Property 8. NC$^i_1$ and NC$^i_2$ gain no information of the real values which are compared and of the result of the comparison.

Proof: The input data sent to NC$^i_1$ and NC$^i_2$ are garbled with random values. Thus they cannot distinguish them from random values. In the same way, all values returned by Y$^S$ are also garbled with unrelated random bits. Thus NC$^i_1$ and NC$^i_2$ only gets random values and then cannot infer the actual values of the inputs or results. If PS keeps history of intermediate results, it might deduce a part of the aleatory bits that were used to encode its results sent to NC$^i_1$ and NC$^i_2$. However, this gives no information of actual data.

Complexity: Length of bit vector is l: COMPARE$^S$ executes $l \oplus$ operations and $l - 1 \sqrt{S}$. Thus NC$^i_1$ and NC$^i_2$ compute $13l - 12$ binary operations (plus 1 negation in NC$^i_1$ or NC$^i_2$), generate $2l - 2$ aleatory bits, receive $4l - 3$ bits (including inputs) and send $5l - 4$ bits (including the result). On PS side, PS computes $4l - 4$ binary operations, generates $l - 1$ aleatory bits, receives $4l - 4$ bits and sends $2l - 2$ bits.

5.4 The Algorithm $\neg^S$ and NOP$^S$

Both are very simple to implement, by negating or not the value in NC$^i_1$ and/or NC$^i_2$: If none or both negate the value it is a NOP$^S$ operation but if only one does it, it is a $\neg^S$ operation. In the point of view of NC$^i_1$ (respectively NC$^i_2$), there is no way to know which operation is really executed as none of them knows whether or not the other site negates or not its value. We also may implement these operation by involving PS in the process to increase the confusion of NC$^i_1$ and NC$^i_2$ but it will consume extra time.

6. CONCLUSION

In this paper, we proposed a new approach to do any computation in a collaborative environment while preserving privacy and applied it to the intrusion detection problematic. Via our approach an application can use knowledge from foreign databases to identify whether a request corresponds to an attack or not. We have demonstrated that the proposed architecture ensured that it is impossible to identify which database has given the answer and that none of the internal components of the architecture can infer knowledge on the databases or on the request from the data they got. Our approach may also provide the type of the attack when they are specified in the databases. We also demonstrate that the cost of this secure computation is linear with the one of the same computation executed in a non-secure way. The approach also seems to be very scalable and one of our current focus is to study in which cases each site is required depending of the needs of programs code privacy or anonymity of sites. The second one concern the ability to detect when one or more of the non-colluding site does not conform to the edicted protocol. And another one concern the efficiency of operators (i.e introduce more powerful and efficient operators like arithmetic ones) and the definition of a programming language upon the SAX architecture to simplify the task of encoding.

7. REFERENCES