A Secure D Flip-Flop against Side Channel Attacks

Abstract : Side Channel Attacks (SCAs) are a serious threat against security of cryptographic algorithms. Most of the countermeasures proposed to protect cryptosystems against these attacks, are efficient but present a significant area and power consumption overhead. The registers being the main weakness of cryptosystems, the source of leaks the more easily exploitable, we proposed a secure DFF which reduces leaks. In this paper, we present this countermeasure which considerably increases the robustness of cryptographic algorithms against side channel attacks. Moreover, the area and power overhead of our secure DFF in a cryptosystem is attractive.
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Communication dans un congrès
PATMOS'11: Power and Timing Modeling Optimization and Simulation, Sep 2011, Portugal. pp.331-340, 2011, 〈http://patmos.dacya.ucm.es/〉
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https://hal-lirmm.ccsd.cnrs.fr/lirmm-00762027
Contributeur : Philippe Maurine <>
Soumis le : jeudi 6 décembre 2012 - 13:00:50
Dernière modification le : jeudi 24 mai 2018 - 15:59:24

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  • HAL Id : lirmm-00762027, version 1

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Philippe Maurine, Bruno Vaquie, Sébastien Tiran. A Secure D Flip-Flop against Side Channel Attacks. PATMOS'11: Power and Timing Modeling Optimization and Simulation, Sep 2011, Portugal. pp.331-340, 2011, 〈http://patmos.dacya.ucm.es/〉. 〈lirmm-00762027〉

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