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Practical Analysis of RSA Countermeasures Against Side-Channel Electromagnetic Attacks

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Motivation

- RSA is a continuing subject of many side-channel attacks
- Is there a combination of countermeasures which provides sufficient protection against most advanced side-channel attacks?
  - Simple and Collisions-based Attacks
  - Differential and Correlation Analyses
  - Single Execution Attacks on Exponentiations
- Different levels of countermeasures

Agenda

- Countermeasures
- RNS-based RSA
- The Proposed Hardware
- Robustness Against Electromagnetic Analysis:
  - Collision-based attacks
  - Correlation Analyses
  - EM Analysis vs Hardware Countermeasures

RSA: Countermeasures

1. Algorithmic: Blinded Exponentiation

$$N = p \times q$$

$$\phi(N) = (p - 1)(q - 1)$$

$$c = m^e \bmod N$$

$$er = e + r \cdot \phi(N)$$

Exponent Blinding

$$A_0 = 1 + r_1 \cdot n \bmod r_2 \cdot n$$

$$A_1 = m + r_1 \cdot n \bmod r_2 \cdot n$$

Additive Message Blinding

for $i = t - 1 : 0$

$$A_{\overline{er_i}} = A_0 \cdot A_1 \bmod N$$

$$A_{er_i} = A_{\overline{er_i}} \cdot A_{er_i} \bmod N$$

Regular Exponentiation:
Montgomery Ladder

end for

RSA: Countermeasures

2. Hardware

- Minimize the Signal-to-Noise Ratio (SNR)
  - Variable location (localized EM analyses)
  - Clock jitter
  - Dummy cycles
  - Frequency dividers

Single Execution (Trace) Attacks on Exponentiation:

- Horizontal Attacks
- Supervised and Unsupervised Template Attacks

RSA: Countermeasures

3. Arithmetic: The Leak Resistant Arithmetic*

- LRA is a derivative of RNS arithmetic for PKC algorithms;
- RNS is a fast, parallel and natural msg blinding arithmetic;
- Immune to collision, differential and (vertical/horizontal) correlation attacks.
- $C_k^{2k} \approx 2^{2k} / \sqrt{\pi k}$ different representations (k = number of moduli).

All variables are randomized during the exponentiation:

- *Moduli* could be recovered during the *Radix to RNS Conversion*
- For 32 *moduli*: $\text{Prob}[\text{moduli guessed} = \text{moduli hardware}] = 1.65 \cdot 10^{-9}$
- **Preliminar conclusion:** vulnerabilities will be only related to RAM and CPU executions (conditional tests, addressing, etc.)

* J.-C. Bajard, L. Imbert, P.-Y. Liardet, and Y. Tégliat, "Leak resistant arithmetic," in *CHES'04, ser. LNCS, vol. 3156*. Springer, 2004, pp. 62–75.

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Residue Number System

A integer X is represented according to a base $\mathcal{B} = (b_1, b_2, \dots, b_n)$ of relatively prime integers (*moduli*). Then:

$$\langle X \rangle_{\mathcal{B}} = (x_1, x_2, \dots, x_k)$$

where $x_i = X \bmod b_i$. Then, operations $+$, $-$, $\cdot$ are performed modulo b_i :

$$x_i + y_i \bmod b_i$$

$$x_i - y_i \bmod b_i$$

$$x_i \cdot y_i \bmod b_i$$

Notation: $|X|_{b_i} = X \bmod b_i$

RNS Montgomery Ladder

Data: x in $\mathcal{A} \cup \mathcal{B}$, where $\mathcal{A} = (a_1, a_2, \dots, a_k)$, $\mathcal{B} = (b_1, b_2, \dots, b_k)$, $A = \prod_{i=1}^k a_i$,
 $B = \prod_{i=1}^k b_i$, $\gcd(A, B) = 1$, $\gcd(B, N) = 1$ and $e = (e_{n-1} \dots e_1 e_0)_2$.

Result: $z = x^e \bmod N$ in $\mathcal{A} \cup \mathcal{B}$

Pre-Computations: $|AB \bmod N|_{\mathcal{A} \cup \mathcal{B}}$

$$A_0 = MM(1, AB \bmod N, N, \mathcal{A}, \mathcal{B}) \quad (\text{in } \mathcal{A} \cup \mathcal{B})$$

$$A_1 = MM(x, AB \bmod N, N, \mathcal{A}, \mathcal{B}) \quad (\text{in } \mathcal{A} \cup \mathcal{B})$$

for $i = n - 1$ **to** 0 **do**

$$\quad | \quad A_{\overline{e_i}} = MM(A_{\overline{e_i}}, A_{e_i}, N, \mathcal{B}, \mathcal{A}) \quad (\text{in } \mathcal{A} \cup \mathcal{B})$$

$$\quad | \quad A_{e_i} = MM(A_{e_i}, A_{\overline{e_i}}, N, \mathcal{B}, \mathcal{A}) \quad (\text{in } \mathcal{A} \cup \mathcal{B})$$

end

$$A_0 = MM(A_0, 1, N, \mathcal{B}, \mathcal{A}) \quad (\text{in } \mathcal{A} \cup \mathcal{B})$$

→ Transform the input data $(1, x)$ into the Montgomery domain by inverting $\mathcal{A}$ and $\mathcal{B}$
In the two calls of MM:

➤ $1.AB.A^{-1} \bmod N = 1.A^2B \bmod N = B \bmod N$

➤ $x.AB.A^{-1} \bmod N = x.A^2B \bmod N = x.B \bmod N$

Montgomery Multiplication

Classical arithmetic: (Montgomery Constant $R=2^k$, k is the bit-length)

$$q = x.y.(-N^{-1}) \bmod R$$

$$s = \frac{x.y + q.N}{R}$$

Return $x.y.R^{-1} \bmod N$

Residue Number System: (Montgomery Constant $B = \prod_{i=1}^k b_i$, k is the number of moduli in base $\mathcal{B} = (b_1, \dots, b_i)$)

Base $\mathcal{A}$

$q_{\mathcal{A}}$

$$w_{\mathcal{A}} = (x_{\mathcal{A}}.y_{\mathcal{A}} + q_{\mathcal{A}}.N_{\mathcal{A}})/B$$

Base Extension

$\leftarrow$

$\rightarrow$

Base $\mathcal{B}$

$$q_{\mathcal{B}} = x_{\mathcal{B}}.y_{\mathcal{B}} \cdot | - N^{-1} |_{\mathcal{B}}$$

$w_{\mathcal{B}}$

Return $x.y.B^{-1} \bmod N$

RNS Montgomery Multiplication

$$s_B = x_B \cdot y_B$$

$$s_A = x_A \cdot y_A$$

$$q_B = s_B \cdot | - N^{-1} |_B$$

$$q_A \leftarrow q_B$$

BE1

$$w_A = (s_A + q_A \cdot N_A) \cdot B^{-1}$$

$$w_B \leftarrow w_A$$

BE2

Fast Approximation Base Extension (CRT):

$$X = \sum_{i=1}^k B_i |x_i B_i^{-1}|_{b_i} - f \cdot B \quad B_i = \frac{B}{b_i}$$

$$|X|_A = \left| \sum_{i=1}^k B_i |x_i B_i^{-1}|_{b_i} \right|_{a_i} - f \cdot |B|_{a_i}$$

$$f = \left\lfloor \left(\sum_{i=1}^k |q \cdot B_i^{-1}|_{b_i} \right) / 2^m \right\rfloor$$

$$q_A = \left| \sum_{i=1}^k |q|_{b_i} \cdot B_i \right|_A - |f \cdot B|_A$$

$$f = \left\lfloor \left(2^{m-1} + \sum_{i=1}^k |w \cdot A_i^{-1}|_{a_i} \right) / 2^m \right\rfloor$$

$$w_B = \left| \sum_{i=1}^k |w|_{a_i} \cdot A_i \right|_B - |f \cdot A|_B$$

RNS Montgomery Multiplication

Improved Version [*]

$$s_B = x_B \cdot y_B$$

$$s_A = x_A \cdot y_A$$

$$q_B = |s_B \cdot B_i^{-1} - N^{-1}|_B$$

$$f = \left\lfloor \left(\sum_{i=1}^k |q|_{b_i} \right) / 2^m \right\rfloor$$

$$w_A = s_A \cdot B^{-1} + \sum_{i=1}^k |q|_{b_i} \cdot B_i \cdot N \cdot B^{-1} |_A - |f \cdot B \cdot N \cdot B^{-1}|_A$$

$$q_A = |w \cdot A_i^{-1}|_A$$

$$f = \left\lfloor \left(2^{m-1} + \sum_{i=1}^k |q|_{a_i} \right) / 2^m \right\rfloor$$

$$w_B = \left| \sum_{i=1}^k |w|_{a_i} \cdot A_i |_B - |f \cdot A|_B \right|$$

	RNS MM	RNS MM Improved
Pre-computations	$2k^2 + 7k$	$2k^2 + 5k$
RNS multiplications	$2k^2 + 7k$	$2k^2 + 5k$

* F. Gandino, F. Lamberti, P. Montuschi, and J.-C. Bajard, "A general approach for improving RNS montgomery exponentiation using pre-processing," in *ARITH20*. IEEE Computer Society, 2011, pp. 195–204.

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Proposed and Evaluated Hardware

Moduli as Pseudo-Marsenne Number:

$$b_i = 2^w - c_i$$

$$x \leftarrow (x \bmod 2^w) + c_i \cdot (x/2^w) \quad (\text{two times})$$

All RNS Units operate in all RNS moduli

All RNS Units store All pre-computed values

With Fixed Bases (32 moduli, 32 bits): pre-computations need **8.5 kB**

With Randomized Bases (32 moduli, 32 bits): pre-computations need **118 kB**

LRA Precomputations

- RNS Bases are randomized once before each exponentiation.
- Clock cycles (512 bits):

FC = Radix to RNS
RC = RNS to Radix

Clock Cycles Overhead: 1%

Memory Overhead: 92%

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Collision Attacks

- Identify redundant operations by collecting two (averaged or not) traces for different chosen-message pairs:
  - (x, x^2) : Doubling Attack
  - $(x, -x)$: Yen's et al Attack
  - (x^α, y^β) : Homma's et al Attack

for $i = t - 1 : 0$

$$A_{\overline{er_i}} = A_0 \cdot A_1 \bmod N$$

$$A_{er_i} = A_{er_i} \cdot A_{er_i} \bmod N$$

end for

LRA vs Collision Attacks

$EM(T_S, x, e_i)$ = squaring EM trace at e_i

$EM(T_S, x, e_{i-1})$ = squaring EM trace at e_{i-1}

$$SNR = 20 \cdot \log_{10} \frac{P_{signal}}{P_{noise}} =$$

$$= 20 \cdot \log_{10} \frac{\sigma^2_{(EM(T_S, x, e_{i-1}))}}{\sigma^2_{(EM(T_S, x, e_{i-1}) - EM(T_S, x^2, e_i))}}$$

Correlation Attacks

HW_m = Hamming Weight of a Data m

$t_i(j)$ = sample j of a trace i

$$\rho(HW_m, t_i(j)) = \frac{\text{cov}(HW_m, t_i(j))}{\sqrt{\text{var}(HW_m)\text{var}(t_i(j))}}$$

Vertical:

- Correlate HW x Trace

Horizontal (Immune to Exponent Blinding):

- Correlate HW x Trace
- Correlate Trace x Trace*

*C. Clavier, B. Feix, G. Gagnerot, C. Giraud, M. Rousselet and V. Verneuil, "ROSETTA for Single Trace Analysis," in *INDOCRYPT 2012*;

LRA vs Correlation Attacks

Vertical:

FIXED BASES

RANDOMIZED BASES

Horizontal: Proposed for Long-Integer Multiplications

Horizontal: RNS Multiplications

Single Execution Attacks

- Why? Exponentiation is randomized.
  - Exponent: $er = e + r.\phi(N)$
  - Message: Leak Resistant Arithmetic
- Which attacks?
  - Horizontal attacks;
  - Supervised, semi-supervised and unsupervised template attacks:

□ Montgomery Ladder -> Find the means (μ) and std dev (σ) of two classes:

- $N(\mu_{(m0)}, \sigma_{(m0)})$: mean and std dev of a **multiplication** when exponent bit is **0**
- $N(\mu_{(m1)}, \sigma_{(m1)})$: mean and std dev of a **multiplication** when exponent bit is **1**
- $N(\mu_{(s0)}, \sigma_{(s0)})$: mean and std dev of a **squaring** when exponent bit is **0**
- $N(\mu_{(s1)}, \sigma_{(s1)})$: mean and std dev of a **squaring** when exponent bit is **1**

Single Execution Attacks on RNS Exponentiation

RAM, CPU: **exponent-dependent activities**

What are the RAM leakages?

- Fixed Exponent:
  - Averaged EM traces: **remove the data dependency**

$$\overline{m_0} = \frac{1}{N_{tr}} \sum_{i=1}^{N_{tr}} m_i(0)$$

$$\overline{m_1} = \frac{1}{N_{tr}} \sum_{i=1}^{N_{tr}} m_i(1)$$

$$\overline{s_0} = \frac{1}{N_{tr}} \sum_{i=1}^{N_{tr}} s_i(0)$$

$$\overline{s_1} = \frac{1}{N_{tr}} \sum_{i=1}^{N_{tr}} s_i(1)$$

$$\overline{m_0} - \overline{m_1} =$$

$$\overline{s_0} - \overline{s_1} =$$

Conditional Tests
RAM Addressing

RAM Addressing Randomization

Intermediate results are never stored in same positions:

```
for  $i = t - 1 : 0$ 
```

$$A_{er_i} = A_0.A_1 \bmod N$$

$$A_{er_i} = A_{er_i}.A_{er_i} \bmod N$$

```
end for
```

Multiplication(1):
 $A0 = A0.A1 \bmod N$
read(A0, A1)
write(A0)

Squaring(1):
 $A1 = A1.A1 \bmod N$
read(A1)
write(A1)

Multiplication(0):
 $A1 = A0.A1 \bmod N$
read(A1)
write(A1)

RAM Addressing Randomization

We took a fixed sample point t_i representing the RAM addressing (writing):

Unprotected:

Protected:

Conclusions

- We evaluated the combination of **Algorithmic + Arithmetic + Hardware** countermeasures against side-channel EM Analyses.
- LRA is a robust solution against simple, collisions, correlation and horizontal analyses (HW vs Trace).
- The major impact of LRA countermeasure is given in terms of memory (92%), not time (1%).
- Hardware countermeasures reduce the efficiency of single executions (trace) analysis on exponentiations (reduce the SNR).

Future Works:

- We will evaluate the effect of **Algorithmic + Arithmetic + Hardware** countermeasures against supervised and unsupervised template attacks.

Thank you for your attention!

QUESTIONS?

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