

Scan chain encryption in Test Standards

Mathieu da Silva, Marie-Lise Flottes, Giorgio Di Natale, Bruno Rouzeyre

▶ To cite this version:

Mathieu da Silva, Marie-Lise Flottes, Giorgio Di Natale, Bruno Rouzeyre. Scan chain encryption in Test Standards. SURREALIST: SecURity, REliAbiLity, test, prIvacy, Safety and Trust of Future Devices, May 2018, Bremen, Germany., Workshop on SecURity, REliAbiLity, test, prIvacy, Safety and Trust of Future Devices, 2018. lirmm-01882578v1

$HAL~Id:~lirmm-01882578 \\ https://hal-lirmm.ccsd.cnrs.fr/lirmm-01882578v1$

Submitted on 27 Sep 2018 (v1), last revised 10 Oct 2018 (v2)

HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of scientific research documents, whether they are published or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in France or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L'archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire **HAL**, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d'enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés.










Mathieu Da Silva, Marie-Lise Flottes, Giorgio Di Natale, Bruno Rouzeyre

SURREALIST 2018

CONTEXT


Test standards

• IEEE 1149 (JTAG) for board testing





CONTEXT






SUMMARY

- 1) Scan chain encryption
- 2) State-of-the-art based on test communication encryption
- 3) Implementation with block cipher
- 4) Implementation with stream cipher
- 5) Conclusion



SCAN CHAIN ENCRYPTION


Solution: test communication encryption



- Input decryption prevents sending desired test data
- Output encryption prevents reading plain test responses



SCAN CHAIN ENCRYPTION




- Input decryption prevents sending desired test data
- Output encryption prevents reading plain test responses
- Test/debug only possible by authorized user knowing the secret key



SYMMETRIC CIPHER

Symmetric Encryption




2 types of symmetric cipher: stream and block ciphers



STREAM CIPHER / BLOCK CIPHER

- Stream cipher encryption
 - Keystream XORed <u>bitwise</u> with the plaintext



- Block cipher encryption
 - Confusion and diffusion on a <u>block</u> of plaintext

Plaintext R

Block cipher

Key

Ciphertext c

- Preference for stream ciphers
 - "Naturally" adapted to serial test communication (JTAG, IEEE 1500, IJTAG)


Plaintext R

- Smaller area footprint compared to block ciphers
- But ...



TWO-TIMES PAD: STREAM CIPHER REQUIREMENT

 Two-times pad: same key and IV re-used => same keystream generated to encrypt different data



⇒ Possible to carry out attacks if requirement is not fit

$$R1 \oplus S(W, Key) \oplus R2 \oplus S(W, Key)$$

⇒ Solution: *IV* generated randomly at each circuit reset

$$R1 \oplus S(IV_1, Key) \oplus R2 \oplus S'(IV_2, Key)$$




SUMMARY

- 1) Scan chain encryption
- 2) State-of-the-art based on test communication encryption
- 3) Implementation with block cipher
- 4) Implementation with stream cipher
- 5) Conclusion



STREAM-BASED ENCRYPTION ON JTAG INTERFACE

Challenge/Response protocol to encrypt JTAG test communication



Requirement not fulfilled


3) Encryption of the JTAG TDR with the keystream S(IV, Key)



STREAM-BASED ENCRYPTION ON IEEE 1500 INTERFACE

o IEEE 1500 standard


- Similar as JTAG standard, but for SoC wrappers
- Parallel test inputs WPI and parallel test outputs WPO





STREAM-BASED ENCRYPTION ON IEEE 1500 INTERFACE


- Encrypt test data on a targeted core (IEEE 1500)
 - Send the key to the core via specific scan chain non-visible from the others cores





STREAM-BASED ENCRYPTION ON IEEE 1500 INTERFACE


- Encrypt test data on a targeted core (IEEE 1500)
 - 1) Encrypt the parallel input/output (WPI and WPO)





STREAM-BASED ENCRYPTION ON IJTAG INTERFACE


 Encryption of Test Data Register associated to Instruments in the IJTAG network





OUR PROPOSITION

• Insertion of block or stream ciphers at Scan-In and Scan-Out



- Assumption: original circuit embedded a crypto-core with its key management and storing
- Scan chain encryption solution shares the key management and storing already implemented




SUMMARY

- 1) Scan chain encryption
- 2) State-of-the-art based on test communication encryption
- 3) Implementation with block cipher
- 4) Implementation with stream cipher
- 5) Conclusion



BLOCK CIPHER-BASED SCAN ENCRYPTION


- Implementation on scan chain with 2 PRESENT block ciphers:
 - Lightweight (1 PRESENT = 2 139 GE)
 - Encryption by 64-bits block size





MODE OF OPERATIONS

64 bits encrypted every 32 clock cycles




- ⇒ #SFF = Px64
- ⇒ No test time overhead on each pattern





Mode of operations



- \Rightarrow #SFF = Px64 + R
- ⇒ Loss of U clock cycles per pattern






SUMMARY

- 1) Scan chain encryption
- 2) State-of-the-art based on test communication encryption
- 3) Implementation with block cipher
- 4) Implementation with stream cipher
- 5) Conclusion



STREAM CIPHER-BASED SCAN ENCRYPTION


- Implementation on JTAG:
 - 1 TRIVIUM stream cipher (2 016 GE)
 - TRNG to generate random IV
 - New instruction GetIV with a test data register IV




Mode of operations in 2 phases: initialization and encryption



1) TRNG initialization: reach sufficient entropy to generate random number











3) Stream cipher setup










ENCRYPTION PHASE


- User sends GETIV instruction
- ⇒ Shift the content of the IV register out the circuit





ENCRYPTION PHASE

 User can encrypt and decrypt test data with the obtained IV and the shared secret key





TIME FOR THE INITIALIZATION PROCESS

- \circ $T_{TRNG\ init}$ to initialize the TRNG
- o 80 clock cycles to shift the IV in the register
- 1 152 clock cycles for the stream cipher setup

Original circuit	Triple-DES	Pipelined AES-128	Pipelined AES-256	RSA 1024	LEON3
Test time* (clock cycles)	687 101	1 944 877	4 559 845	39 405 239	11 612 051
Test time overhead					
Block-based solution (%)	+0.31	+0.81	+0.006	+0.33	+0.004
Stream-based solution (%)**	+0.18	+0.06	+0.03	+0.003	+0.01

^{*:} Test time considered for a fault coverage of 100%, except for LEON3 where it reaches 70%

^{**:} test time overhead without the initialization of the TRNG



SUMMARY

- 1) Scan chain encryption
- 2) State-of-the-art based on test communication encryption
- 3) Implementation with block cipher
- 4) Implementation with stream cipher
- 5) Conclusion



COMPARISON BETWEEN BOTH SOLUTIONS

	Block cipher-based solution (PRESENT)	Stream cipher-based solution (TRIVIUM)				
Security						
- Scan attacks	Protected	Protected (two times pad not possible)				
- Malicious core	Protected	Protected				
Cost						
- Area	10 658.96 μm²	5 408.52 μm² (+ 31 200 μm² for TRNG)				
- Test time	Depends on the scan length (multiple or not of the block size)	Clock cycles required for the initialization phase				
Integration						
- Diagnosis & debug	Still possible in-field					
- Key management	Re-use key management already implemented					
- Integration in test daisy-chain	Possible issue with the padding of test data	No issue				



Thankyou