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A GALS Pipeline DES Architecture to Increase Robustness Against CPA and CEMA Attacks

Abstract : Side channels attacks (SCAs) are very effective and low cost methods to extract secret information from supposedly secure cryptosystems. The traditional synchronous design flow used to create such systems favors the leakage of informa-tion, which enables attackers to draw correlations between data processes and circuit power consumption, electromagnet-ic radiation or other sources of leakage. By using well known analysis techniques, these correlations may allow that an at-tacker retrieves secret cryptographic keys. Differential Power Analysis (DPA) and Differential Electromagnetic Analysis (DEMA) are among the most cited attack types. More accurate types of attacks have been proposed, including Correla-tion Power Analysis (CPA) that associates power quantities with a specific power model. In recent years, several coun-termeasures against SCAs have been proposed. Fully asynchronous and globally asynchronous locally synchronous (GALS) design methods appear as alternatives to design tamper resistant cryptosystems. However, according to previous works they use to achieve this with significant area, throughput, latency and power penalties and are not absolutely se-cure. This paper proposes a new GALS pipeline architecture for the Data Encryption Standard (DES) that explores the trade-off between circuit area and robustness to SCAs. Robustness is enhanced by replicating the DES hardware structure in asynchronously communicating module instances, coupled with self-varying operating frequencies. Designs proto-typed on FPGAs with the proposed technique presented promising robustness against attacks, after submitted to differen-tial and correlation analyses. This is true for both power and electromagnetic channels. Additionally the proposed archi-tecture displays throughput superior to previously reported results. Index Terms: Cryptography, cryptographic attacks, secure cryptography,
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Contributor : Philippe Maurine <>
Submitted on : Monday, July 11, 2011 - 4:00:12 PM
Last modification on : Wednesday, October 24, 2018 - 9:02:05 AM


  • HAL Id : lirmm-00607871, version 1



Philippe Maurine, Rafael I. Soares, Ney L. V. Calazans, Victor Lomné, Amine Dehbaoui, et al.. A GALS Pipeline DES Architecture to Increase Robustness Against CPA and CEMA Attacks. Journal of Integrated Circuits and Systems, Brazilian Microelectronics Society, 2011, 5, pp.001-010. ⟨lirmm-00607871⟩



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