Is Side-Channel Analysis really reliable for detecting Hardware Trojans?

Giorgio Di Natale 1 Sophie Dupuis 1 Bruno Rouzeyre 1
1 SysMIC - Conception et Test de Systèmes MICroélectroniques
LIRMM - Laboratoire d'Informatique de Robotique et de Microélectronique de Montpellier
Abstract : Hardware Trojans are malicious alterations to a cir- cuit, inserted either during the design phase or during fabrication process. Due to the diversity of Trojans, detecting and/or locating them is a challenging task. Numerous approaches have been proposed to address this problem, whether logic testing based or side-channel analysis based techniques. In this paper, we focus on side-channel analysis, and try to underline the fact that no published technique until now has proven its efficiency on reliable experiments.
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Communication dans un congrès
DCIS: Design of Circuits and Integrated Systems, Nov 2012, Avignon, France. 27th Conference on Design of Circuits and Integrated Systems, pp.238-242, 2012
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Soumis le : vendredi 17 mai 2013 - 10:00:45
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Giorgio Di Natale, Sophie Dupuis, Bruno Rouzeyre. Is Side-Channel Analysis really reliable for detecting Hardware Trojans?. DCIS: Design of Circuits and Integrated Systems, Nov 2012, Avignon, France. 27th Conference on Design of Circuits and Integrated Systems, pp.238-242, 2012. 〈lirmm-00823477〉

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