Using Outliers to Detect Stealthy Hardware Trojan Triggering?

Papa-Sidy Ba 1 Sophie Dupuis 1 Marie-Lise Flottes 1 Giorgio Di Natale 1 Bruno Rouzeyre 1
1 SysMIC - Conception et Test de Systèmes MICroélectroniques
LIRMM - Laboratoire d'Informatique de Robotique et de Microélectronique de Montpellier
Abstract : Hardware Trojans (HTs) are malicious alterations to a circuit introduced at design or manufacturing phases by an adversary. Due to their diversity, detecting and/or locating them are challenging tasks. Among the different kinds of detection methods, methods based on logic testing aim to reveal the presence of HTs thanks to their logical activation and observation through primary outputs. However, HTs are stealthy in nature, i.e. mostly inactive unless triggered by a very rare condition. Furthermore, test patterns must be developed without any knowledge on the location and function implemented by the HT. A procedure has recently been proposed to identify in a netlist suspicious signals that may be part of a HT introduced at design stage: these so-called " outliers " present an activity poorly correlated with other signals. In this paper, we undertake to use outliers in order to detect a HT introduced at manufacturing stage. We propose a test pattern generation technique based on the exploration of outliers. Our assumption is that such signals may be selected by an attacker in order to trigger his/her HT.
Keywords : Outliers Hardware Trojan Detection Logic testing Cross correlation Clustering
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Conference papers
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Submitted on : Wednesday, July 20, 2016 - 1:38:34 PM
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Papa-Sidy Ba, Sophie Dupuis, Marie-Lise Flottes, Giorgio Di Natale, Bruno Rouzeyre. Using Outliers to Detect Stealthy Hardware Trojan Triggering?. IVSW: International Verification and Security Workshop, Jul 2016, Sant Feliu de Guixols, France. ⟨lirmm-01347119⟩

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