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Conference Papers Year : 2020

Side-channel Attacks on Blinded Scalar Multiplications Revisited

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Thomas Roche
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  • PersonId : 874391
Laurent Imbert
Victor Lomné
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  • PersonId : 859402

Abstract

In a series of recent articles (from 2011 to 2017), Schindler et al. show that exponent/scalar blinding is not as effective a countermeasure as expected against side-channel attacks targeting RSA modular exponentiation and ECC scalar multiplication. Precisely, these works demonstrate that if an attacker is able to retrieve many randomizations of the same secret, this secret can be fully recovered even when a signi-ficative proportion of the blinded secret bits are erroneous. With a focus on ECC, this paper improves the best results of Schindler et al. in both the generic case of random-order elliptic curves and the specific case of structured-order elliptic curves. Our results show that larger blinding material and higher error rates can be successfully handled by an attacker in practice. This study also opens new directions in this line of work by the proposal of a three-steps attack process that isolates the attack critical path (in terms of complexity and success rate) and hence eases the development of future solutions.
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Dates and versions

lirmm-02311595 , version 1 (11-10-2019)

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Thomas Roche, Laurent Imbert, Victor Lomné. Side-channel Attacks on Blinded Scalar Multiplications Revisited. CARDIS 2019 - 18th Smart Card Research and Advanced Application Conference, Nov 2019, Prague, Czech Republic. pp.95-108, ⟨10.1007/978-3-030-42068-0_6⟩. ⟨lirmm-02311595⟩
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