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Conference papers

A Side Journey To Titan: Revealing and Breaking NXP's P5x ECDSA Implementation on the Way

Thomas Roche 1 Victor Lomné 1 Camille Mutschler 1, 2 Laurent Imbert 2
2 ECO - Exact Computing
LIRMM - Laboratoire d'Informatique de Robotique et de Microélectronique de Montpellier
Abstract : The Google Titan Security Key is a FIDO U2F hardware device proposed by Google (available since July 2018) as a two-factor authentication token to sign in to applications such as your Google account. In this paper, we present a sidechannel attack that targets the Google Titan Security Key 's secure element (the NXP A700x chip) by the observation of its local electromagnetic radiations during ECDSA signatures. This work shows that an attacker can clone a legitimate Google Titan Security Key. As a side observation, we identified a novel correlation between the elliptic curve group order and the lattice-based attack success rate.
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Contributor : Laurent Imbert Connect in order to contact the contributor
Submitted on : Thursday, August 19, 2021 - 12:09:35 PM
Last modification on : Tuesday, March 15, 2022 - 4:39:16 PM
Long-term archiving on: : Saturday, November 20, 2021 - 7:06:21 PM


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  • HAL Id : lirmm-03322561, version 1


Thomas Roche, Victor Lomné, Camille Mutschler, Laurent Imbert. A Side Journey To Titan: Revealing and Breaking NXP's P5x ECDSA Implementation on the Way. USENIX Security 2021 - 30th USENIX Security Symposium, Aug 2021, Virtual, Canada. pp.231-248. ⟨lirmm-03322561⟩



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