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New side-channel attack against scan chains

Jean da Rolt 1 Marie-Lise Flottes 1, * Giorgio Di Natale 1 Bruno Rouzeyre 1
* Corresponding author
1 SysMIC - Conception et Test de Systèmes MICroélectroniques
LIRMM - Laboratoire d'Informatique de Robotique et de Microélectronique de Montpellier
Abstract : Insertion of scan chains is the most common technique to ensure observability and controllability of sequential elements in an IC. However, when the chip deals with secret information, the scan chain can be used as back door for accessing secret (or hidden) information, and thus jeopardize the overall security. Several scan-based attacks on cryptographic functions have been described and shown the need for secure scan implementations. These attacks assume a single scan chain. However the conception of large designs and restrictions in terms of test costs may require the implementation of many scan chains and additional test infrastructures for test response compression. . In this paper, we present a new generic scan attack that covers a wide range of industrial test infrastructures, including spatial response compressors.
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Submitted on : Tuesday, December 6, 2011 - 9:47:06 AM
Last modification on : Tuesday, September 1, 2020 - 11:32:04 AM
Long-term archiving on: : Wednesday, March 7, 2012 - 2:25:07 AM


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  • HAL Id : lirmm-00648575, version 1



Jean da Rolt, Marie-Lise Flottes, Giorgio Di Natale, Bruno Rouzeyre. New side-channel attack against scan chains. 9th CryptArchi Workshop (2011), Jun 2011, Bochum, Germany. pp.2. ⟨lirmm-00648575⟩



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