How Much Should You Pay for Information?: Technical Report

Ioannis Vetsikas 1 Madalina Croitoru 2
2 GRAPHIK - Graphs for Inferences on Knowledge
LIRMM - Laboratoire d'Informatique de Robotique et de Microélectronique de Montpellier, CRISAM - Inria Sophia Antipolis - Méditerranée
Abstract : The amount of data available greatly increases every year and information can be quite valuable in the right hands. The existing mechanisms for selling goods, such as VCG, cannot handle sharable goods, such as information. To alleviate this limitation, in this paper, we study mechanisms for selling goods that can be shared or copied. We present and analyze theoretically and experimentally efficient incentive compatible mechanisms for selling a single sharable good to bidders who are happy to share it.
Document type :
Reports
Complete list of metadatas

Cited literature [10 references]  Display  Hide  Download

https://hal-lirmm.ccsd.cnrs.fr/lirmm-00830805
Contributor : Madalina Croitoru <>
Submitted on : Wednesday, June 5, 2013 - 4:56:14 PM
Last modification on : Thursday, May 24, 2018 - 3:59:22 PM
Long-term archiving on : Friday, September 6, 2013 - 4:13:37 AM

File

tech-report-mechanism-informat...
Files produced by the author(s)

Identifiers

  • HAL Id : lirmm-00830805, version 1

Collections

Citation

Ioannis Vetsikas, Madalina Croitoru. How Much Should You Pay for Information?: Technical Report. RR-13018, 2013, pp.16. ⟨lirmm-00830805⟩

Share

Metrics

Record views

279

Files downloads

1342