Extraction of intrinsic structure for Hardware Trojan detection

Abstract : In this paper we present a novel solution to address the problem of potential malicious circuitry on FPGA. This method is based on an a technique of structure extraction which consider the infection of an all lot. This structure is related to the design (place and route, power grid...) of the integrated circuits which composes the lot. In case of additional circuitry this design will be modify and the extracted structure will be affected. After developing the extraction techniques we present a method- ology to insert detection of hardware trojan and counterfeit in different IC manufacturing steps. At last an application example using 30 FPGA boards validate our extraction method. Finally, statistical tools are then applied on the experimental results to distinguish a genuine lot from an infected one and confirm the potential of detection the extracted structure.
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Cryptology ePrint Archive: Report 2015/912. 2015, pp.2015/912
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Lecomte Maxime, Jacques Fournier, Philippe Maurine. Extraction of intrinsic structure for Hardware Trojan detection. Cryptology ePrint Archive: Report 2015/912. 2015, pp.2015/912. 〈lirmm-01319491〉

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