A Leak Resistant Architecture Against Side Channel Attacks

Hardware implementations of cryptographic algorithms may leak some information that can be used to recover cryptographic keys. This work combines reconfigurable techniques with the recently proposed Leak Resistant Arithmetic (LRA) to thwart some Side Channel Attacks (SCA). The introduced architecture outcomes the performance of classical implementation of modular multiplication, for key size exceeding 2048 bits, with a reasonable extra area overhead. Nevertheless, this is not a drawback, but a cost, since the main issue of the proposed architecture is the improved robustness in terms of security.

Domaines

Micro et nanotechnologies/Microélectronique

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A_Leak_Resistant_Architecture_Against_Side_Channel.pdf (313.01 Ko)

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Christine Carvalho De Matos : Connectez-vous pour contacter le contributeur

https://hal-lirmm.ccsd.cnrs.fr/lirmm-00102784

Soumis le : mercredi 3 avril 2019-14:26:02

Dernière modification le : vendredi 24 mars 2023-14:53:10

Dates et versions

lirmm-00102784 , version 1 (03-04-2019)

Identifiants

HAL Id : lirmm-00102784 , version 1
DOI : 10.1109/FPL.2006.311335

Citer

Daniel Mesquita, Lionel Torres, Benoit Badrignans, Gilles Sassatelli, Michel Robert, et al.. A Leak Resistant Architecture Against Side Channel Attacks. FPL: Field-Programmable Logic and Applications, Aug 2006, Madrid, Spain. pp.881-884, ⟨10.1109/FPL.2006.311335⟩. ⟨lirmm-00102784⟩

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