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On the Existence of Credible Incentive Equilibria

Alain Jean-Marie 1 Mabel Tidball 2 
1 APR - Algorithmes et Performance des Réseaux
LIRMM - Laboratoire d'Informatique de Robotique et de Microélectronique de Montpellier
Abstract : This paper provides a set of necessary conditions for the existence of credible incentive equilibria. We study the cases of static games and dynamic games with open-loop strategies. We conclude that credible incentive equilibria with differentiable incentive functions do not exist without strong conditions on the payoff functions of the players. On the other hand, for piecewise-differentiable incentive functions, an inffnity of solutions is usually possible.
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Submitted on : Monday, October 23, 2006 - 8:52:34 AM
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  • HAL Id : lirmm-00108648, version 1


Alain Jean-Marie, Mabel Tidball. On the Existence of Credible Incentive Equilibria. ISDG'04: 11th International Symposium on Dynamic Games and Applications, Dec 2004, Tucson, Arizona, United States. ⟨lirmm-00108648⟩



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