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Conference Papers Year : 2004

On the Existence of Credible Incentive Equilibria


This paper provides a set of necessary conditions for the existence of credible incentive equilibria. We study the cases of static games and dynamic games with open-loop strategies. We conclude that credible incentive equilibria with differentiable incentive functions do not exist without strong conditions on the payoff functions of the players. On the other hand, for piecewise-differentiable incentive functions, an inffnity of solutions is usually possible.
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lirmm-00108648 , version 1 (23-10-2006)


  • HAL Id : lirmm-00108648 , version 1


Alain Jean-Marie, Mabel Tidball. On the Existence of Credible Incentive Equilibria. ISDG'04: 11th International Symposium on Dynamic Games and Applications, Dec 2004, Tucson, Arizona, United States. ⟨lirmm-00108648⟩
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