Power Analysis Attack Against post-SAT Logic Locking schemes - LIRMM - Laboratoire d’Informatique, de Robotique et de Microélectronique de Montpellier Access content directly
Conference Papers Year : 2024

Power Analysis Attack Against post-SAT Logic Locking schemes


Due to the globalization of the semiconductor industry, Integrated Circuits (ICs) and Intellectual Properties (IPs) are susceptible to specific threats. IP piracy, overproduction, and introduction of hardware Trojans can indeed compromise valuable design information and trust in the design flow. Logic Locking (LL) is one of the most popular Design-for-Trust techniques that aims to thwart these threats because of the wide range of risks it can prevent. This approach evolves from year to year in order to make it resistant to ever more advanced attacks. While most advanced LL solutions are assumed to be resistant against differential power analysis (DPA), we propose a new attack framework for challenging these approaches and show on several benchmarks that it is possible to reveal more than 88% of the key bits used for locking the designs thanks to DPA.
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lirmm-04628663 , version 1 (28-06-2024)



Nassim Riadi, Florent Bruguier, Pascal Benoit, Sophie Dupuis, Marie-Lise Flottes. Power Analysis Attack Against post-SAT Logic Locking schemes. ETS 2024 - 29th IEEE European Test Symposium, May 2024, The Hague, Netherlands. pp.1-6, ⟨10.1109/ETS61313.2024.10567311⟩. ⟨lirmm-04628663⟩
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